The Diversity Risk Paradox
Veronica Root Martinez *
There is a growing body of literature discussing the proper role of
diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts by and within public firms. A
combination of forces brought renewed energy to this topic over the past few
years. The #MeToo movement demonstrated a whole host of inequities faced by
women within workplaces. Business Roundtable’s 2019 Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation rejected the view that the purpose of the corporation
was solely to be focused on the maximization of shareholder wealth. And, in
2020, the murder of George Floyd ignited a racial reckoning within the United
States, which prompted many firms to rethink and reaffirm their commitments
to creating diverse, equitable, and inclusive workplaces. Chris Brummer and
Leo E. Strine, Jr.’s Duty and Diversity, the subject of this Response piece, takes
on the issue of diversity efforts within public firms directly. They argue that “the
pursuit of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is solidly authorized by the operation
of traditional corporate law principles and can even be easily squared with the
views of those who embrace what has come to be known as ‘shareholder
primacy.’ ” Their piece is an excellent and comprehensive addition to the
current literature.
This Response focuses on how concerns about risk may influence firms
as they evaluate how to best engage in more robust and meaningful diversity,
equity, and inclusion efforts. It highlights the tension that can be created when
members of a firm fail to take certain risks seriously enough while
simultaneously allowing potential risks to block a subset of potentially
impactful reforms. First, the failure by a firm to act in accordance with its
public statements regarding diversity could create risks for the firm over the
long term. Second, members of firms may sometimes be deterred, whether
implicitly or explicitly, out of concerns that taking certain actions might create
new zones of risk for the firm. These two realities can create a sort of risk
paradox. This Response argues that for a firm to properly address the diversity
risk paradox, it must consider what actions are likely to lead to the creation of
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a culture of equity and inclusion throughout the firm. By prioritizing equity and
inclusion, firms can engage in more productive risk assessments about what
diversity efforts to prioritize and pursue.
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INTRODUCTION
In Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr.’s Article, Duty and
Diversity, 1 they persuasively argue that the decision of a firm to pursue
diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) policies and practices is
consistent with the traditional fiduciary duties that firm directors and
managers are required to adhere to today. Their account is
breathtaking for its intellectual rigor, its comprehensive treatment of
the issue, its persuasiveness, and, importantly, its willingness to
wrestle with evidence that both supports and detracts from their
argument. Indeed, when reading the piece, in many instances I began
to think of a counterargument to what they presented only to find them
address that argument in the very next paragraph. In short, the piece
is a well done and important contribution to the growing body of work
on the proper role and treatment of diversity efforts within public firms.
This Response will focus on the role of risk within firms’
decisionmaking
efforts
related
to
diversity,
equity,
and
inclusion initiatives.
First, while Brummer and Strine’s Duty and Diversity Article
tackles a variety of issues related to risk management, there is a related
issue that might benefit from further analysis as scholars continue to
discuss diversity within public firms. Under the Marchand v. Barnhill 2

1.
2.

Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2022).
Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d. 805 (Del. 2019).
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and In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation 3 cases, the Delaware
Supreme Court has now allowed Caremark 4 claims to proceed when a
board has failed to monitor “mission critical” corporate risks. When one
pairs these developments in caselaw with firms’ public statements
regarding their commitment to diversity over the past two years, it
suggests that an argument can be made that a failure by a public firm
to address diversity concerns amounts to a failure to monitor mission
critical risks. For example, Walgreens recently noted in its annual
disclosures that it knows that its diversity, equity, and inclusion work
is “critical to the overall success of our company.” 5 Additionally,
statements made by those in top management at a variety of public
firms in the wake of the murder of George Floyd might make them
susceptible to Caremark 6 claims should they fail to meet the diversity
goals that they articulated and set out for themselves. In short, the
diversity rhetoric of firms in 2020 and 2021 may lead to potential
litigation if a firm’s board fails to properly monitor the implementation
of its diversity initiatives. Thus, under Marchand and Boeing, a
proactive board must manage the risks created by the firm’s own
rhetoric and statements about the firm’s need for and commitment
to diversity.
Second, Brummer and Strine argue, correctly, that firms are
legally permitted to—and should—engage in certain activities to
promote better internal DEI initiatives. 7 Initiatives that are legally
permitted, however, are often deemed to not be legally advisable out of
fear that such activity may increase the firm’s zone of legal liability. A
focus on legal liability, while prudent, should not deter a firm from
considering the full scope of risks, like reputational risks, that could
occur as a result of not pursuing an effective DEI strategy. When a firm
considers whether to engage in activity that is above what is legally
required, it must understand that to not do so also carries with it its
own set of risks and liabilities.

3.
In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No. 2019-0907-MTZ, 2021 BL 337478 (Del. Ch. Sept.
7, 2021).
4.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The phrase
“Caremark claims” is understood as stockholder derivative claims for breach of directors’ oversight
duties. Under such claims, a court will conduct a two-part examination, looking first at whether
the board completely failed to implement an adequate board-level reporting or control system; if a
firm did implement such a system, the court then considers whether the board failed to properly
monitor its system once putting it in place. Id.
5.
Andrew Ramonas, S&P 500 Opens Up on Diversity After Floyd as Investors Seek More,
BL (Feb. 11, 2022, 6:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/s-p-500-opens-up-ondiversity-after-floyd-as-investors-seek-more [https://perma.cc/WZ5E-UQMC].
6.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959.
7.
See Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 5.
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The two points I have outlined, however, create a paradox. On
the one hand, I am arguing that firms should be cautious about the
potential risks created by their public commitment to engage in activity
above the legally required floor when crafting their DEI initiatives. On
the other hand, I am critiquing the reluctance of firms to move beyond
the minimum conduct required by the law when thinking through the
diversity initiatives they seek to implement, as failing to move beyond
what is legally required could create its own set of risks. In short, many
firms are confronting what this Response refers to as a “diversity risk
paradox.”
The diversity risk paradox sets up a variety of questions for
firms to work through. Should they do more than what is legally
required? Brummer and Strine’s argument in Duty and Diversity makes
a compelling case in favor of this perspective. Legal standards and rules
in this area create a floor—but much can be built upon that floor to
advance the cause of diversity within corporations today. If firms were
to do more than what is legally required, however, they must ask an
additional question: What should the guiding principle be when
deciding when and how to act above what is legally required? This
Response argues that to address the diversity risk paradox, firms must
consider what actions are likely to lead to the creation of a culture of
equity and inclusion throughout the firm. By elevating the concerns of
equity and inclusion, firms can engage in more productive risk
assessments about what diversity efforts to pursue.
This argument may seem a bit circular given that diversity
initiatives are often labeled as “diversity, equity, and inclusion”
initiatives. The reality, however, is that the “diversity” piece is often the
primary focus of those working on new DEI initiatives within firms, and
that when people say diversity, what they often mean is an effort to
increase the representation of some mix of individuals whose
demographic status (women, people of color, the disabled, etc.) is
underrepresented within that firm. The pursuit of greater demographic
diversity—something I have argued in favor of as a response to the
current state of diversity within firms today 8—is both laudable and
necessary. But as is shown by the diversity risk paradox, different sets
of diversity initiatives come with different sorts of risks. This Response
argues that when making risk assessments related to what DEI
initiatives a firm will adopt, the firm should prioritize those that it
believes are likely to create more equitable and inclusive organizations.

8.
Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, 130 YALE L.J.F. 869
(2021).
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Part I of this Response piece examines the ways in which
Brummer and Strine identified risks associated with DEI efforts. Part
II presents the diversity risk paradox, which leaders within firms must
address when determining what DEI initiatives to pursue. Part III
argues that for a firm to properly address the diversity risk paradox, it
must consider what actions are likely to lead to the creation of a culture
of equity and inclusion throughout the firm.
I. DIVERSITY & RISK
An underlying theme within Brummer and Strine’s Duty and
Diversity is the way in which diversity efforts intersect with concerns
about risk more generally within firms. 9 Their account highlights the
complex ways in which a firm’s risk assessments and risk management
programs can impact the firm’s decision to engage in certain DEI
efforts. This Part will highlight some of the observations Brummer and
Strine make regarding the role of risk and diversity.
A. Risks Diversity Mitigates
At the outset of their piece, Brummer and Strine note that one
deterrent for firms to “commit their companies to Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion policies that go beyond the legal minimum of
nondiscrimination” is the argument that firms that do so might face
“possible legal risk for failing to focus solely on corporate profit.” 10 In
particular, those who advance this argument are often concerned that
if firms pursue an objective other than profit maximization, it could
result in shareholder suits and other forms of litigation. Brummer and
Strine reject this premise, arguing “that corporate law presents no
barrier to voluntary corporate efforts to increase equality and diversity”
within firms. 11
Brummer and Strine, however, go farther than just rejecting the
premise of the above arguments. They go on to explain: “Substantial
evidence exists [showing] that companies with good DEI practices
will . . . be less likely to face adverse legal, regulatory, worker,
community, and consumer backlash from their conduct[.]” 12 This is
based, in part, on the findings of some researchers regarding the
benefits of cognitive decisionmaking to combat groupthink. 13 The
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.; see also id. at 24.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 35.
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upshot is “that Diversity can lead to more communication on boards and
even more accountability of management.” 14 Less groupthink and
better communication are both results that should help minimize a
large range of risks for firms.
Strine and Brummer also posit that “[e]mployment
discrimination may be less likely where there is a strong culture of
inclusion and a highly Diverse workforce.” 15 They explain that a diverse
corporate staff could lead to better handling of complaints and concerns
regarding discrimination, which in turn, could help minimize the sorts
of frustrations by employees that lead to the risk of lawsuits or other
undesirable outcomes. 16
Additionally, Brummer and Strine note that having diversity
within and throughout the ranks of a company could prevent it from
encountering certain restrictions or penalties. 17 For example, in
“February 2020, Goldman Sachs announced that it will only underwrite
IPOs for U.S. and European private companies that have at least one
Diverse board member.” 18 As calls for more diverse boards and
workplaces are increasingly being tied to certain formal and informal
penalties, 19 having a demographically diverse organization may help
mitigate new and emerging risks for firms.
B. Reputational Risks
Brummer and Strine—moving from their focus on ways in which
a more diverse firm might be able to manage its risks more effectively—
also persuasively detail the ways a lack of demographic diversity can
lead to various types of reputational risk for firms. 20 For example, firms
that lack certain types of demographic diversity within their ranks may
have difficulty recruiting top talent. 21 Additionally, a range of industry
surveys demonstrate that if consumers have a negative perception of a
firm’s diversity efforts, such perceptions can have a negative impact on

14. Id. at 36.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 56–60 (exploring various “market ‘EESG’ initiatives” that promote or require
diversity within firms).
18. Id. at 60.
19. See, e.g., David A. Bell, Dawn Belt & Jennifer J. Hitchcock, New Law Requires Diversity
on Boards of California-Based Companies, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 10,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/10/new-law-requires-diversity-on-boards-ofcalifornia-based-companies/ [https://perma.cc/TM9L-CQ68].
20. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 41–48.
21. Id. at 43.
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the firm’s reputation. 22 Firms, therefore, must consider the ways in
which their lack of diversity or DEI initiatives could impact the
reputation of the firm over both the long- and short-term.
II. THE DIVERSITY RISK PARADOX
Brummer and Strine do an excellent job of recounting many
different ways in which focusing on diversity efforts can either
minimize or create risks for a firm. Their analysis is both expansive and
thorough. There are, however, additional risks that might arise as a
result of a firm’s diversity efforts. This Response focuses on two distinct,
yet related, risks that firms often confront when working on DEI
initiatives and issues.
First, the failure of a firm to act in accordance with its own public
statements regarding diversity could create risks for the firm over the
long-term. As Brummer and Strine explain, “Caremark requires good
faith efforts by directors to ensure their companies have policies
designed to promote compliance.” 23 Traditionally, as long as firms have
engaged in those good faith efforts, they have been insulated from
liability, even when their initiatives have failed. A few years ago, it
likely would have been very difficult for a successful Caremark claim to
have been brought by shareholders on the basis of the firm’s failure to
accomplish its DEI goals or initiatives. 24 There is reason, however, to
believe that Caremark litigation based on DEI deficiencies might
succeed today. Second, the firm’s decision to not act—or their reluctance
to act—above the legally required floor as it relates to DEI efforts may
also create non-legal risks for firms, ranging from dissatisfaction by
employees with the firm’s complacency to consumer pushback and
reputational harm to the firm.
22. Id. at 43–44; see, e.g., Karen Donovan, Pushed by Clients, Law Firms Step Up Diversity
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/business/21legal.html
[https://perma.cc/ETA3-K7X8] (noting that “Wal-Mart Stores ha[d] dropped two law firms—
pulling active work from them—because of unhappiness with the firms’ lack of diversity”); Taylor
Mallory Holland, Why the Lack of Diversity in Business Has Reached a Tipping Point, HUFFINGTON
POST: BLOG (May 7, 2017) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-the-lack-of-diversity_b_9857316
[https://perma.cc/6LY8-XGKZ] (“Now that consumers care more about diversity, businesses have
to care more—and put themselves on the hook to actually do something about it. Lip service is no
longer enough. In fact, hypocritical claims can get companies into even hotter water in terms of
consumer trust.”).
23. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 83.
24. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013,
2031 (2019) (In examining the cases leading up to 2019, “approximately one hundred Delaware
cases ha[d] cited the 1996 landmark Caremark opinion [but] . . . [o]versight liability after a trial
on the merits [wa]s extremely rare . . . with few claims surviving motions [to dismiss]. Examining
these cases reveals that oversight ha[d] evolved in application to require a showing that borders
on, or includes, utter failure or disobedience”).
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A. Firms’ Own Statements
Firms have engaged in a variety of statements that suggest
diversity efforts and initiatives are in fact central to their compliance
risks. For example, Walgreens recently explained that its diversity,
equity, and inclusion work is "critical” to the success of the company. 25
Importantly, Walgreens is not an outlier. After the murder of George
Floyd in the summer of 2020, dozens of firms issued statements
explaining the importance of diversity within their firms. 26 Some firms
even went so far as to identify specific goals and objectives for the firm
to meet along a variety of dimensions. 27 Nike, for instance, has issued
disclosures that have “included information about goals to increase the
number of minority employees.” 28 Additionally, in response to relatively
new human capital disclosures required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), 29 it appears that the vast majority of firms
responding to the disclosures in 2021 included “a qualitative discussion
regarding the company’s commitment to diversity, equity, and
inclusion.” 30 These statements varied in depth, “ranging from generic
statements expressing the company’s support of diversity in the
workforce to detailed examples of actions taken to support
underrepresented groups and increase the diversity of the company’s
workforce.” 31 The combination of the statements made in 2020 in
response to the death of George Floyd, as well as the 2021 human
capital disclosures related to DEI concerns, suggests that firms
understand that their diversity initiations are “intrinsically critical” to
their firms’ internal business operations. 32 Moreover, the arguments
25. Ramonas, supra note 5.
26. Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 8, at 883–84.
27. Id. at 893 (discussing Blackrock Investment’s goal to double its representation of Black
senior leaders and increase its overall representation by thirty percent by year 2024); id. at 900
(noting PepsiCo’s commitment to increase “its number of [B]lack managers by [thirty] percent by
2025 . . . and . . . add[] more than 250 [B]lack employees to its managerial positions, including a
minimum of 100 [B]lack employees to the executive ranks”) (internal citation omitted).
28. Ramonas, supra note 5.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2021).
30. Discussing Human Capital: A Survey of the S&P 500’s Compliance with the New SEC
Disclosure Requirement One Year After Adoption, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTHER LLP 2 (Nov. 10,
2021),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/discussing-human-capitalsurvey-of-sp-500-compliance-with-new-sec-disclosure-requirement-one-year-after-adoption.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA3M-DP27].
31. Id.
32. See Emily Steel, Fox Establishes Workplace Culture Panel After Harassment Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/media/fox-news-sexualharassment.html [https://perma.cc/3VV3-VAEK] (discussing how “[s]ome shareholders ha[d]
expressed concern[s] that 21st Century Fox’s management and its board failed to address the
[sexual harassment] crisis and have risked the company’s reputation, operations and long-term
value”) (emphasis added).
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that Brummer and Strine make, which are detailed in Part I, also
support the notion that diversity efforts are mission critical to firms.
These statements are important for a variety of reasons, one of which
is that they could be used in future litigation to demonstrate that
diversity is of extreme importance for firms.
Delaware courts have issued recent opinions that have allowed
Caremark claims to proceed when a board has failed to monitor
“mission critical” corporate risks. 33 In Marchand, the court allowed
shareholders to proceed against directors of the firm in a Caremarkbased claim for allegedly failing to monitor “mission critical” risks that
the firm faced at that time. 34 Specifically, the court explained that a
board is required to “make a good faith effort to put in place a
reasonable system of monitoring and reporting about the corporation’s
central compliance risks.” 35 Moreover, the court noted that if a board
were to fail to take steps to ensure that “it is informed of a compliance
issue intrinsically critical to the company’s business operation” such
failure would lend credence to the notion “that the board has not made
the good faith effort that Caremark requires.” 36
The decision in Marchand was, however, unusual, leading many
scholars to wonder what it would mean for future cases. In the recent
Boeing 37 case, the importance of Marchand appears to have been
confirmed. Specifically, Boeing established that firms must have
structures in place to inform the board about “mission critical” issues. 38
One of the critiques levied against firms by myself and others is that

33. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No.
2019-0907-MTZ, 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021).
34. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824.
35. Id. at 824.
36. Id. at 822.
37. In re Boeing, 2021 WL 4059934.
38. There have been a number of assessments done of this new line of cases that reflect the
importance of this new “mission critical” standard. See, e.g., Darryl Lew, Courtney Hague
Andrews, Stephanie Silk Cunha & John Hannon, In Re Boeing Decision Underscores Need for RiskBased Corporate Governance by Directors, WHITE & CASE LLP (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/re-boeing-decision-underscores-need-risk-basedcorporate-governance-directors [https://perma.cc/5QHN-KBRW]; Lisa Stark & Sara M.
Kirkpatrick, Another “Well-Pled” Caremark Claim Survives A Motion To Dismiss: Lesson from
Recent Cases on Risk Management, Compliance Systems, and Fiduciary Duties, K&L GATES LLP
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.klgates.com/Another-Well-Pled-Caremark-Claim-Survives-AMotion-To-Dismiss-Lessons-From-Recent-Cases-On-Risk-Management-Compliance-SystemsAnd-Fiduciary-Duties-11-18-2019 [https://perma.cc/3LVL-BA6J]; Paul J. Lockwood & Veronica B.
Bartholomew, Delaware Supreme Court Reinforces Director Oversight Obligation, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
&
FLOM
LLP
(Nov.
19,
2019),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/11/insights-the-delaware-edition/delawaresupreme-court-reinforces [https://perma.cc/U7VJ-FECE].
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they are failing to fully track and assess their DEI efforts. 39 As
Brummer and Strine explain, “[f]iduciaries are . . . not excused from
ignoring red flags indicating widespread discrimination; should they do
so not only do companies risk liability accompanying such violations,
but directors too face possible derivative suits and liability.” 40 Without
a system in place for robust board oversight of DEI initiatives, a
plaintiff might be able to persuasively argue that the firm is ignoring
important red flags. Consequently, if DEI is a mission critical endeavor
for a firm—a conclusion that likely follows given the various firms’ own
statements over the past two years—the failure to proactively oversee
DEI initiatives could therefore be a potentially significant risk for firms.
Thus, the upshot of viewing the voluntary statements that firms
have made through the lens of the most recent Delaware case law is
that firms’ own statements regarding their stated diversity priorities
have the potential to lead to shareholder litigation. Indeed, as Brummer
and Strine note:
Corporations have increasingly recognized that effective DEI compliance efforts are
required by Caremark and are increasingly expected by all corporate stakeholders. This
confluence has itself given rise to new legal theories by corporate plaintiffs’ lawyers,
arguing that fiduciaries have not only failed to comply with Caremark in their DEI
policies, but have misled investors by overstating their adherence to their own state
DEI goals. 41

Accordingly, a proactive board should carefully manage the risks
created by the firm’s own rhetoric and statements regarding the
importance of diversity. 42

39. See, e.g., Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 8, at 903; Veronica Root, Retaining Color, 47
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 631–32 (2014); Deborah L. Rhode and Lucy Buford Rica, Diversity in
the Legal Profession: Perspectives from Managing Partners and General Counsel, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2483 (2015) (noting that many business “leaders appeared to see no necessity for formal
assessments and . . . believed that the organization’s ‘culture and open door policy’ made people
feel that they could raise concerns”).
40. Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 81.
41. Id. at 84.
42. One might levy a counterargument against diversity, equity, and inclusion as qualifying
as a mission critical risk. For example, one could argue that Boeing was focused on the safety of
planes and Marchand was focused on food safety. As such, one could read the cases as being limited
to only those risks that are directly related to the product or service being provided to consumers.
The reality, however, is that no one knows exactly how far the Delaware courts will take the
concept of “mission critical.” If firms self-identify diversity, equity, and inclusion as “critical” to
their business—as firms have begun to do explicitly in public statements and disclosures since the
death of George Floyd—they are opening themselves up to potential lawsuits on this issue going
forward. Only time will tell whether these suits would in fact be successful. My own view is that if
a firm identifies a risk as critical to its functioning or the core values of the firm, it is an issue that
the board should focus on intently. The firm is in the best position to identify what is most
important for its proper long-term functioning, and if it identifies a risk area, the courts should
hold the board accountable if it fails to properly oversee that risk.
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B. Firms’ Reluctance to Act
Brummer and Strine suggest that firms are free to engage in
diversity efforts above what the law requires. For example, they note
that under Caremark,
[t]he business judgment rule gives [firms] substantial room to create a corporate culture
with higher standards of integrity, fairness, and ethics than the law demands if they
believe that will increase the corporation’s value, enhance its reputation, or otherwise
rationally advance the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 43

Additionally, they explain that:
Corporate law also gives fiduciaries protection if they decide that the best way to avoid
violations of law and negative reputational harm to the corporation, and achieve longerterm value, is for the corporation to embrace policies and goals that go beyond the legal
minimum and to strive for the exemplary, even at the cost of short-term
shareholder value. 44

In doing so, Brummer and Strine make a full-throated argument
in favor of firms going beyond what is legally required in an effort to
finally make progress on diversity.
However, when firms engage in policies and practices beyond
what they are legally required to do, it increases their zone of legal
liability. Sanctions within the compliance space, for example, are not
limited to technical violations of legal and regulatory mandates. Firms
are also sanctioned or penalized when they fail to adhere to their own
internal policies and procedures. For instance, Cheryl Wade has
discussed how the Office of Minority & Women Inclusion Office created
under Section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act 45 can recommend that agencies terminate
contracts with regulated firms, contractors, and subcontractors if they
believe that these firms have failed to make a “good faith effort” to
include women and minorities in its workforce. 46 The upshot is that
despite Brummer and Strine’s accurate statements that firms are
permitted to engage in diversity efforts beyond what is legally required,
leaders at firms who attempt to pursue this strategy may actually
encounter pushback from members of their own institution because of
the types of risks identified above.
43. Id. at 77.
44. Id. at 89.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 5452.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 5452(c)(3); Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Compliance That Advances Racial
Diversity and Justice and Why Business Deregulation Does Not Matter, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 611,
619 (2018). However, as Wade points out, the risks posed by Section 342 to firms and business
contracted with various agencies in the government have yet to truly come to fruition given the
“corporate bar’s dismissal and criticism of the provision, but also by the language its drafters used,
which blunts its potential impact.” Id. at 621.
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Take, for example, the statements that firms made after the
murder of George Floyd. The summer of 2020 was not the first
opportunity that firms had to put forth proactive statements in support
of the Black Lives Matter movement or to assert their commitment to
reforming their firms’ DEI initiatives. 47 Indeed, a small subset of firms
had done so a few years earlier. 48 A number of reasons might explain
why firms had been reluctant to do so before. They may have been
worried about commenting on a social movement. They may have
worried that supporting Black Lives Matter along with a more assertive
endorsement of diversity efforts might be just as unappealing to one
subset of consumers as it would be as appealing to another. But the
reason that matters most for purposes of this Response piece is that it
is entirely plausible that firms’ legal departments advised them not to
issue statements in the years prior to Mr. Floyd’s death.
Whenever a firm engages in activity that is above what is legally
required, it potentially increases its zone of legal risk. When a legal
department perceives that an activity could result in an increase in the
firm’s zone of liability, it may deter the firm and board from taking that
course of action. Over the years, I have had anecdotal conversations
with individuals in compliance departments at public firms who
recounted getting pushback from lawyers within their internal legal
department when they attempted to create a standard of conduct or
expectations above what was legally required. Strine and Brummer
properly note that it is legally acceptable to engage in fulsome DEI
efforts. 49 The reality, however, is that some firms’ attempts to adopt
diversity initiatives above what is legally mandated might be thwarted
by their very own legal departments, or others, due to concerns that
efforts above what is legally required could result in new zones of
liability for the firm.
C. The Paradox
Firms committed to improving their DEI efforts today are
encountering a bit of a paradox. On the one hand, they have issued
sweeping public statements, and in some cases formal disclosures to the
SEC, expressing their support for DEI initiatives. In doing so, they may
have inadvertently increased their zone of risk under Delaware law. On
47. Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 8, at 874 n.22, 880–83.
48. Veronica Root Martinez, A More Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 47–48 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds.,
2021) (discussing Ben & Jerry’s corporate statements and actions taken in support of the
#BlackLivesMatter movement in 2016 and 2018).
49. See Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 77–81.
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the other hand, when it comes time to implement policies and
procedures to put initiatives in place, firms may face significant
pushback from their legal departments due to concerns about an
increase in the firm’s legal liability as a result of these new initiatives.
In other words, the various risks associated with diversity for firms
have converged to create what this Response calls the “diversity risk
paradox.” If firms do too little, they could be opening themselves up to
liability under Delaware law. If firms do more than what is legally
required, they could increase their zone of legal liability. They are, quite
literally, damned if they do and damned if they don’t. And the realities
of this paradox—which every firm has and continues to face—have
crippled the ability of firms to adopt effective DEI initiatives that would
transform their organizations in the ways that firms’ leaders have
promised for decades.
III. THE PROMISE OF EQUITY AND INCLUSION
Given the diversity risk paradox, the question confronting
leaders within firms is how should they decide what diversity efforts to
pursue? What decisionmaking framework will help guide them when
determining how to structure their DEI initiatives? On the one hand,
they have overwhelmingly indicated their support for improving their
DEI efforts, yet doing so may result in additional risks for the firm. On
the other hand, those attempting to engage in more robust DEI efforts
might receive pushback from insiders, making it difficult to get
anything of substance adopted by the firm.
The reality is that it is impossible to eliminate all of the risks
presented in this Response, which can make it difficult to identify the
right path forward. One could turn in an infinite number of circles
attempting to determine which path forward would minimize risks for
shareholders. Try though they might, firms cannot make all of their
decisions through the lens of cost-benefit analysis and attempts to
minimize risk. Thus, for some decisions, firms must look to the ends
that they are attempting to achieve and use that as their guiding
principle for how to order their decisionmaking. The ends of DEI
programs, however, must not simply be to increase demographic
diversity. The true goal must be to create an equitable and
inclusive culture. 50
This ultimate goal of achieving an organization with a culture
that is both equitable and inclusive can be used as an analytical
50. Indeed, as Brummer and Strine explain, “Diversity can only be operationalized as an
organizational feature if it is accompanied by an equitable and inclusive culture.” Id. at 41.
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framework by which a firm can assess which diversity efforts it should
or should not prioritize. If the diversity initiative is likely to contribute
to the creation of the culture that the firm is pursuing, it should receive
strong consideration when determining whether it is worth
implementing. Adoption of the initiative should be considered even if it
could have the secondary effect of creating some sort of risk for the firm.
However, if the potential initiative is not likely to contribute towards
the firm’s effort to create an equitable and inclusive culture, then it
should be abandoned.
Some might wonder why firms would adopt diversity initiatives
that are unlikely to result in the creation of an equitable and inclusive
culture. There could be a variety of reasons. The firm might believe the
initiative would be strong from a public relations standpoint and
increase the firm’s reputation with regards to diversity. 51 The firm
might also believe that it needs to implement the initiative, even if it
does not think it would be particularly effective, in an effort to stay in
line with industry peers. Or the firm could believe it needs to do
“something,” and therefore feels like it must implement the first idea
that sounds strong. The problem with adopting these more haphazard
initiatives is that not only can they result in an increased risk for the
firm, but they also will likely fail to produce any meaningful reward
because the initiatives are not strategically aligned with the firm’s true
goal of creating an equitable and inclusive culture. Under this context,
firms use diversity as a transactional lever 52 without actually
attempting to engage in efforts that will meaningfully address the
underlying DEI shortcomings within firms.
This Response argues that firms can make better decisions
about what DEI initiatives to pursue by focusing on those initiatives
that are likely to assist them with their ultimate goal of creating an
equitable and inclusive culture within the firm. Using this framework
for decisionmaking will not eliminate the risks associated with diversity
within firms. Nothing will. But it will help to better align the diversity

51. See Wade, supra note 46, at 634 (discussing calls for 21st Century Fox to increase the
number of women serving on its board following Fox’s multimillion dollar sexual harassment
settlements); see also Steel, supra note 32 (noting how 21st Century Fox hired a new global head of
human resources, a new head of human resources at Fox News, expanded training and created
more ways for employees to report harassment or discrimination in the wake of reports of the
company’s settlements).
52. The transactional nature of many of today’s diversity initiatives within firms and other
organizations can be personally harmful to those who end up being pulled by the diversity lever.
As Brummer and Strine note: “Whether we are respected and are treated as worthy of equal
respect with each other during our time at work is critical to whether we have a life that is
fulfilling.” Brummer & Strine, supra note 1, at 65. The stakes for firms’ DEI initiatives are high
for the firms themselves, but in many ways, they are even higher for firms’ employees.
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risks that are taken with the ultimate reward—a more equitable and
inclusive organization—that firms are attempting to achieve.
CONCLUSION
Every decision a firm makes has an element of risk. The goal
cannot be to eliminate all risks. Instead, firms must implement
frameworks to guide their decisionmaking. This Response provides a
potential framework for helping firms make decisions about what DEI
efforts to pursue. If firms consider what DEI efforts are likely to lead to
the creation of a culture of equity and inclusion throughout the firm, it
will provide a framework for the firm to address the diversity risk
paradox head-on.

